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Collectively, the articles reveal several important patterns regarding the strategic dynamics of the BRI. First, and across the board, the contributions highlight the deep intertwine between economic cooperation and geopolitical dynamics in the global South and beyond. Downes and Lai demonstrate how in the post-COVID19 context, EU China relations shifted from economic pragmatic engagement to a de-risking strategy as interdependence became increasingly a security concern in a context of growing geopolitical tensions. In similar lines, Santos and Costa how the China-Economic Corridor (CPEC) functions simultaneously as a development tool and a strategic vector for China's westward expansion while at the same time reducing its strategic maritime trade vulnerabilities (Malacca, Hormuz and Aden straits). The synergies between economic and strategic logics are also apparent in Central Asia, where Sarybayev et al. demonstrate how China's expanding security cooperation (ranging from border management to joint military exercises) is closely linked to the protection of infrastructure investments, and how development initiatives are undertaken in pursuit of regional stabilisation.Second, the contributions underscore the varied and context-dependent nature of BRI outcomes, while also highlighting how these outcomes are shaped by, and in turn reshape, domestic, regional and global geopolitical dynamics. Rather than producing a uniform pattern of development and influence, the BRI produces differentiated and multifaceted impacts. Gao's analysis of the Hualong-1 nuclear project in Argentina illustrates how domestic vulnerabilities, namely economic and political fragilities and public opposition, interact with external pressures, such as cooperation trade-offs (technological dependency) and US-China rivalry, limiting its policy space and constraining development outcomes. Similarly, Silva study on Pakistan energy sector shows how Chinese investment, while enhancing power generation capacity, can deepen structural dependency while simultaneously altering regional power dynamics, particularly in relation to India, as infrastructure projects become embedded in broader logics of strategic competition, exposing Pakistan to instrumentalization in geopolitical rivalries. This is further highlighted by Sarybayev et al. In central Asia, where China's expanding security role both complements and challenges existing arrangements historically dominated by Russia, producing a fragmented security landscape. Zhang's analysis of the BRI -East Asian Economic Union relationship shows that regional dynamics do not necessarily lead to confrontation, as cooperation between Russia and China economic platforms emerged where interests and mutual dependence converged. However, its depth (e.g. prospects for an FTA) remains limited given persistent strategic concerns over deeper interdependencies. Collectively, these studies suggest that BRI outcomes cannot be understood solely through domestic or bilateral lenses, but must be situated within evolving regional and global dynamics in which multiple actors negotiate, contest or accommodate China's growing engagement.Third, the contributions to special topic complicate conventional assumptions about South-South cooperation by highlighting the asymmetries in the relationships and the persistent risk of dependency with BRI engagements. While outcomes vary across cases, several contributions point to structural dynamics that may entrench unequal partnerships. Silva offers one of the clearest illustrations of this dynamic, showing how China's position as the principal foreign partnership in infrastructure development limits the participations of alternative partners and marginalises local suppliers, creating a pattern of dependence that concerns about long-term strategic autonomy. Similar dynamics are observable in Central Asia, where enhanced connectivity with China reinforce asymmetrical interdependence, namely through trade imbalances and rising debt exposure. As Zhang points out, while the BRI may reduce the region's historical reliance on Russia, it risks substituting one dependency for another, reflecting a broader reconfiguration rather than a pathway to end structural asymmetries. At the same time Gao's study cautions against viewing dependency as a uniform or outcome. His study of the Hualong-1 nuclear project demonstrates how Argentina's technological dependency from China resulted from a complex interplay of domestic vulnerabilities, external pressures and constrained strategic choices. Jointly the findings suggest that while the BRI carries potential to generate new forms of dependency for the GS, these outcomes are contingent, relational and shaped by the interaction of domestic conditions, regional dynamics, and broader power structures.Finally, the special topic highlights the importance of public attitudes in shaping narratives and the legitimacy of BRI engagements. Liu and Thomas demonstrate that public perceptions in China are generally more favourable towards BRI partners than non-partners, while perceptions remain mediated by broader political contexts, including bilateral tensions (e.g. India) and central government narratives. In BRI recipient countries, however, several contributions point to a division between elite and public perceptions, and more ambivalent and critical attitudes towards China and the BRI. In Pakistan, as Silva shows, while political elites emphasise the economic benefits, local communities often perceive BRI projects as disproportionally serving Chinese strategic interests with limited benefits for local populations. Similar patterns emerge in Central Asia, where Sarybayev et al. note that, although elites welcome China's growing role in security and infrastructure, public opinion is more cautious, shaped by concerns over surveillance technologies and the potential erosion of sovereignty. At the same time, public perceptions are not uniformly negative and can shift in response to visible economic gains. Santos and Costa highlight how Chinese investments in Afghanistan have contributed to favourable views of the BRI as infrastructure delivered immediate and tangible benefits to a country devasted by decades of war. Zhang points to mixed attitudes towards the BRI in Central Asia, where it is recognised to contribute to economic growth and regional integration even as criticisms, often amplified in western discourse, persist regarding debt sustainability and long-term risks. Collectively, the findings suggests that public attitudes toward the BRI are uneven and largely shaped by perceived material benefits, levels of inclusion and transparency, and broader concerns about sovereignty and dependency. Public attitudes thus emerge as a critical, although often underexplored, dimension influencing legitimacy and sustainability of BRI across the global South.In a nutshell, the contributions to this special topic suggest that the BRI is best understood not as a coherent or uniform model of South-South cooperation, but as a complex, multidimensional, and context-dependent process. Across the cases examined, the BRI emerges as a project that simultaneously advances economic connectivity and strategic objectives and generates a wide spectrum of outcomes ranging from mutual beneficial cooperation and coordination to constraint and dependency, mediated by domestic conditions, regional dynamics, and broader patterns of great power competition. Future research should pay closer attention to how these dynamics evolve over time, particularly in light of shifting geopolitical alignments, changing domestic conditions, and the growing importance of local perceptions for legitimacy.
Mendes et al. (Thu,) studied this question.