Green labels on online travel platforms have become an important mechanism for disclosing environmental information and guiding sustainable tourism consumption. However, when a platform simultaneously provides green certification and competes with suppliers through its self-operated business, green label adoption may reshape both market competition and environmental outcomes. This study develops a game-theoretic model of a co-opetitive tourism platform supply chain consisting of a tourism service supplier (TSS) and an online travel platform (OTP). Two label adoption strategies are compared: the TSS’s self-labeling strategy and its adoption of the OTP-certified green label. The results show that, under self-labeling, the OTP can gain a competitive advantage by setting a higher price and greenness level, although this advantage weakens as consumer recognition of the TSS’s self-label increases. Under platform-certified labeling, the OTP raises the common green standard, which intensifies price competition between the two parties. In most cases, adopting the OTP’s green label improves supply chain profits; however, under certain combinations of competition intensity and platform label credibility, it may reduce the profits of both members and increase environmental damage. These findings suggest that platform-led green certification does not necessarily improve environmental performance and should be designed as a governance mechanism rather than a purely marketing instrument.
Song et al. (Tue,) studied this question.