We argue that consciousness—understood as reflective self-modelling—may be not an epiphenomenon or evolutionary accident, but an architectural necessity for any system capable of stable self-modification of its own representations. We develop this hypothesis through three moves: (1) demonstrating that systems which revise their own abstractions without self-modelling face unavoidable failure modes (catastrophic forgetting, goal corruption, representational collapse); (2) identifying consciousness with the self-modelling process itself, rather than something produced by or supervening on that process; (3) reframing qualia as perceptual abstractions over computational machinery, analogous to high-level pattern descriptions in other domains. If correct, this framework dissolves the hard problem of consciousness by revealing it as a category error—the demand for an outside description of an intrinsically inside phenomenon. We address resistance to physicalist explanations, arguing that if this understanding is on the right track, it would empower rather than diminish our capacity for ethical reasoning. Notably, this engineering-derived framework converges with Metzinger's Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, which arrives at similar conclusions through representationalist philosophy; the independent derivations mutually strengthen the case that self-modelling is central to consciousness. We discuss implications for artificial general intelligence, evolutionary theory, and the ethics of creating self-modelling systems.
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Barzin Lotfabadi
SANE Mental Health Charity
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Barzin Lotfabadi (Mon,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/698c1bcd267fb587c655dc2b — DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18566266
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