While government corruption is often cited as a reason for poor military performance, little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding how governance structures influence corruption’s impact. To address this gap, we introduce a theory of how corruption undermines military efficacy in armed conflicts, arguing that regime type plays a critical role in shaping the impact of corruption on military performance. We focus specifically on public sector theft and embezzlement on fighting effectiveness. This type of corruption brings especially pernicious effects as it stokes morale problems among military personnel and weakens oversight of fighting effectiveness. To test our theory, we examine the outcomes of all lethal military interstate disputes (MIDS) and intrastate armed conflicts through 2014. Bridging the comparative politics and military effectiveness literatures, our results offer greater insight into how autocratic policies hinder armed forces as well as the need for stronger civilian oversight to ensure battlefield efficacy.
Keels et al. (2025) studied this question.