To promote the sustainable development of power battery recycling, this study investigates the strategic interplay between altruistic preferences and channel structure. Addressing divergent interests and the dynamic evolution of recycling scale and brand reputation, a differential game model with two state variables is constructed to analyze four decision modes: resale/agency under selfish/altruistic scenarios. The results reveal that altruistic preferences induce Pareto improvements, reconciling the recycler’s utility with the partner’s profit growth. Notably, altruism acts as a moderating mechanism that reshapes channel advantages, enabling the Resale–Altruistic (RA) mode to surpass the agency mode as the system-wide optimal state. Furthermore, a substitutive compensation effect between altruistic preference and revenue-sharing contracts is identified. This research provides a quantitative framework for optimizing behavioral contract design and governance in battery recycling ecosystems.
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Qiyou Liu
Ziteng Li
Sustainability
Guangdong University of Technology
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Liu et al. (Sat,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/69df2b49e4eeef8a2a6b03ca — DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/su18083802