In recent years, quantum key distribution (QKD) has evolved from a scientific research field to a commercially available security solution, supported by mathematically formulated security proofs. However, since the knowledge required for a full understanding of a security proof is scattered across numerous publications, it has proven difficult to gain a comprehensive understanding of all steps involved in the process and their limitations without considerable effort and attention to detail. Our paper aims to address this issue by providing a rigorous and comprehensive security proof for the finite-size 1-decoy and 2-decoy BB84 protocols against coherent attacks within Renners entropic uncertainty relation framework. We resolve important technical flaws found in previous works regarding the fixed-length treatment of protocols and the careful handling of acceptance testing. To this end, we provide various technical arguments, including an analysis accounting for the important distinction of the 1-decoy protocol where statistics are computed after error correction, along with a slight improvement of the secure-key length. We also explicitly clarify the aspect of conditioning on events, addressing a technical detail often overlooked and essential for rigorous proofs. We extensively consolidate and unify concepts from many works, thoroughly discussing the underlying assumptions and resolving technical inconsistencies. Therefore, our contribution represents a significant advancement towards a broader and deeper understanding of QKD security proofs.
Wiesemann et al. (2026) studied this question.