Change and Stability in the Family Physician Service System: An Evolutionary Game Approach

The family physician plays an important role in the primary care system in many countries and regions; however, it is still in its infancy in China for many reasons. To help develop the family physician service, we investigated the behaviors of physicians and community residents in the context of signing the service contract with an evolutionary game model and explored the impact of some factors on the equilibrium. The result shows that the professionalization of family physicians, the service publicity, the basic salary for full‐time family physicians, and service diversity are instrumental in the development of family physician service. The result further indicates that financial incentives can have a restricted effect on encouraging physicians to work full‐time, that is, a moderate amount of subsidy might be better than no subsidy or too large. Our work will help decision makers better understand the interaction between physicians and community residents and launch policies to promote family physician service in countries such as China.