The Structural Non-Eliminability of Choice and Its Consequences for Systems with Interpretable Prediction

This work establishes a structural no-go result concerning the eliminability of choice in systems that provide agents with interpretable predictions of the consequences of alternative admissible actions. The analysis considers a minimal class of systems in which predictive structures remain accessible prior to action realization and alternative transitions remain distinguishable up to that point. Within this framework, a precise structural account is given of what it would mean to eliminate choice, independently of psychological, normative, or phenomenological considerations. All logically possible strategies for eliminating choice under these conditions are examined exhaustively. It is shown that each such strategy either preserves the structural conditions under which choice arises or abandons the defining requirements of interpretable prediction and admissible action realization. The elimination of choice is therefore structurally impossible within the class of systems considered. A further consequence of this result is that responsibility, insofar as it applies in such systems, arises only as a derivative of the non-eliminable structure of choice and cannot be coherently analyzed independently of it. The contribution is purely structural and does not advance normative claims or propose system designs. Its purpose is to fix a boundary of admissibility for claims concerning automation, prediction, and the elimination of choice in socio-technical and decision-support systems.