Inequality is often one-sidedly framed as disadvantage. This practice has been identified as problematic by empirical research and critical scholarship, as it can obscure advantage (privilege) and affect responses to inequality. This dissertation examined both the use and the effects of disadvantage versus advantage framing. Article 1 is a systematic literature review of the effects of (dis)advantage framing. It documents the methodological scope of earlier studies and consistent framing effects (m = 36, s = 71, n = 20,063), which served as the foundation to develop the Two-Step Model of (Dis)Advantage Framing Effects. By integrating previous theorizing and empirical findings on a conceptual level, the model provides an explicit rationale why and how (dis)advantage framing may influence responses to inequality. Further, it helps develop more systematic predictions of (dis)advantage framing effects in future research. The remaining Articles examined to what extent (dis)advantage framing is used and reproduced by communicators, using mixed methods. Article 2 leveraged automated syntax-analysis and machine learning to identify the framing of tweets on racial inequality (Study 1: n = 11,292; Study 2: n = 31,984). Black disadvantage framing was used more and was more often retweeted, but was less often quoted and replied to than White advantage framing. Thus, on social media (just like in traditional media), disadvantage framing seems to be more common and spread more than advantage framing, ultimately reinforcing a one-sided framing of inequality. Article 3 reports a series of nine online experiments (eight pre-registered; n = 1,389) which investigated how members of advantaged groups recall an infographic with (dis)advantage framing across different inequalities and in different languages. The recall of framing was measured by recognition of specific statements (using a score) and by recognition of the abstract overall framing of the infographic. Findings showed a consistent privilege-reframing bias: Recipients tended to recall ingroup advantages in terms of outgroup disadvantages on both measures. However, the studies could not evidence that this is because ingroup advantage framing would be more threatening. Nevertheless, the privilege-reframing bias could also reinforce the dominance of disadvantage framing in discourses on inequality. Finally, Article 4 tested a previously overlooked boundary condition to the preference for disadvantage framing. In a correlative Twitter study (n = 1,402) and a pre-registered online experiment (n = 164), the interaction of frame use and valence of inequality aspects was analyzed, based on manual coding. Findings showed that advantage framing was more common for positive aspects (e.g., promotions, chances to adopt a child) than for negative aspects (e.g., poverty, sexual harassment), while disadvantage framing was more common for negative aspects. By identifying conditions under which advantage framing is more prevalent, the findings suggest that considering inequality in positive aspects could encourage talking about advantage. Jointly, the present studies show that the use and the effects of (dis)advantage framing cannot be seen as independent of each other – a perspective which is absent in earlier research. Integrating the findings on frame use (Articles 2 – 4) within the Two-Step Model (Article 1), this dissertation develops an integrative perspective on both research strands. Applying this integrative perspective, I suggest a self-reinforcing dynamic, where the more common disadvantage framing becomes increasingly dominant due to selective recall and reproduction. Given the problematic consequences of a dominant (but ultimately one-sided) framing, I also identify boundary conditions which may facilitate more balanced conversations around inequality.
Annette Malapally (2026) studied this question.
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