Abstract The problem of validity is the fundamental problem of philosophy. In this, transcendental and speculative idealism agree. Concerning the nature of the method to solve this problem, however, transcendental and speculative idealism diverge. Krijnen holds that due to its method, transcendental idealism fails to produce true self-knowledge of reason. In considering itself, thought forgets itself, which leads to the issue of externalitiy as an intrinsic feature of transcendental idealism. Krijnen illustrates this methodically induced externality by scrutinizing some doctrines of transcendental philosophy, placing particular emphasis on the contribution of the later generation of neo-Kantians like Bauch, Cassirer, and Cohn, but finally also on Fichte. The scrutinzed doctrines concerns the much-debated problem of the beginning of philosophy, the highly praised neo-Kantian concept of the concept as a function, and the self-destruction of the concept.
Christian Krijnen (2026) studied this question.