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February 22, 2026International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems0 citationsOpen Access

Day-ahead coordination between the desalination plant and power distribution system: A Stackelberg game-based method

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CHChongqi HuangZWZhenyu WuXZXia Zhao

Key Points

  • This paper aims to enhance demand response in desalination plants through a game-theoretical approach.
  • Introduces a Stackelberg game framework with desalination plants and power distribution systems.
  • Employs a dual-incentive demand response mechanism including time-varying electricity prices.
  • Uses a two-stage genetic algorithm to solve the optimization model and achieve game equilibrium.
  • Conducts case studies on a modified IEEE-33 bus system integrated with a reverse osmosis desalination plant.
  • Reduces demand response energy deviation of the desalination plant by 2,717.2 kWh.
  • Decreases total operating costs of the power distribution system by 7.5% and the desalination plant by 9.1%.
  • Enhances peak-shaving capabilities by 26.8% and valley-filling by 22.7%.
  • Improves the desalination plant's overall energy consumption profile.

Abstract

• Demand response program with dual incentives from electricity prices and subsidies. • Stepped incentives that differentiate peak-shaving and valley-filling periods. • Stackelberg game coordinates power distribution systems and desalination plants. • Genetic algorithm-based iterative method for solving the game equilibrium. The rapid development of renewable energy (RE) has significantly increased the importance of demand response (DR). DR enables electricity consumers to adjust their consumption patterns in response to price signals or incentives, thereby helping to balance supply and demand. Seawater desalination plants that use the reverse osmosis (RO) process are ideal candidates for DR participation, owing to their substantial energy demand and operational flexibility in electricity regulation. However, most existing DR programs for desalination plants depend on fixed incentive parameters, which limit the effective utilization of the plants’ operational flexibility. These fixed parameters cannot meet the varying peak-shaving and valley-filling requirements of the power distribution system (PDS), resulting in significant DR energy deviations and high operating costs for both the PDS and desalination plants. This paper proposes a Stackelberg game-based, day-ahead scheduling framework integrated with a dual-incentive DR mechanism. This mechanism combines time-varying electricity transaction prices with peak-valley differentiated stepped subsidies to better coordinate the PDS and RO desalination plants. In this Stackelberg game framework, the PDS acts as the leader and optimizes the DR parameter package, while the desalination plant, as the follower, adjusts its production and power consumption to maximize its benefits. A two-stage genetic algorithm is employed to solve the optimization model and reach the game equilibrium. Case studies conducted on the modified IEEE-33 bus system connected to an RO desalination plant demonstrate that, compared to conventional fixed-parameter DR programs, the proposed method reduces the DR energy deviation of the desalination plant by 2,717.2 kWh. It also decreases the total operating costs of the PDS and the desalination plant by 7.5% and 9.1%, respectively. Moreover, the optimization enhances peak-shaving by 26.8% and valley-filling by 22.7%, significantly improving the desalination plant’s energy consumption profile.

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Cite This Study

Huang et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/699a9d7a482488d673cd3520https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2026.111713
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