Murray-Hall v. Québec (Attorney General) provides needed certainty and coherence regarding the scope of the criminal law power. Murray-Hall reconciles the criminal law power with the principle of cooperative federalism which favours giving effect to legislation of the provinces and federal government enacted within their respective (potentially overlapping) areas of legislative competence. An expansive interpretation of the criminal law power could upset the balance between federal and provincial powers articulated in section 91 and section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Murray-Hall articulates three principles that limit the scope of the criminal law power, helping to reconcile the criminal law power with cooperative federalism. First, in Murray-Hall the Court affirmed that the criminal law power is prohibitory in nature and does not bestow freestanding or positive rights. Second, the Court confirmed that there is a high burden of proof to establish federal legislation is paramount to provincial legislation by reason of operational conflict or conflict of purpose. This is particularly so where the legislative subject matter has a double aspect. Third, the Court recognized that provincial legislatures may validly consider traditional criminal law purposes when legislating in their sphere of jurisdiction. The articulation of these principles and reaffirmation of the importance of the double aspect doctrine help to delineate the boundaries of the criminal law power and protect the delicate balance between overlapping federal and provincial jurisdiction.
Ranganathan et al. (2026) studied this question.