Strategic Use of Ad Hoc Commissions for Blame Avoidance: Evidence From Chile

ABSTRACT Ad hoc commissions are well known in policymaking, yet their strategic deployment during crises remains less understood. This study examines how governments rely on expert commissions to manage blame and political risk in response to critical events. I argue that while commissions facilitate blame avoidance, their use is constrained when delegating authority to experts poses greater risks than benefits. Using logit models on longitudinal data from Chile (1990–2022), I assess how critical events affect commission appointments. The study draws on a novel dataset constructed through archival research and develops an original indicator of critical events using billions of media records from Google Jigsaw's Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT). The findings reveal a conditional logic: high presidential disapproval and frequent critical events are associated with greater use of commissions, whereas sustained or severe events are linked to lower use. These results suggest that the deployment of expert commissions as a blame avoidance strategy is conditional on governments' political risk calculus.