Empirical evidence shows that both illegitimate and legitimate sources of political parties’ funding can undermine democracy, skew electoral outcomes, and enable state capture. While illegitimate financing is often the focus, this article argues that legal sources of funding equally pose significant risks by promoting elite dominance, limiting citizens’ participation, and weakening institutional capacity for reform. The lack of transparency and accountability surrounding financing sources, value, and expenditure obscures the extent of the influence and reflects the weakness of reform enforcement, such as campaign finance laws. This study investigates how legal political party funding contributes to state capture and affects the implementation of anti-corruption reforms in four West African democracies: Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. To unravel the complex relationship, it explores two central questions. First, what vulnerabilities exist around legal financing that enable state capture? Second, what impact does this have on reform implementation? The article adopts a mixed-methods approach of literature review, a public opinion survey carried out in Nigeria, and the T Index for a cross-country analysis. Through the theoretical lens of Particularism versus Universalism, the study finds that public funds are frequently diverted to fund elections. A means of securing access to power, control, and resources by a few elites. It further reveals that a lack of transparency and regulatory compliance with campaign finance regulations enables state capture, manifesting through defective laws, ineffective institutions, and unequal distribution of resources. Ultimately, the study concludes that, similar to illegal financing, legal financing practices equally diminish democratic quality, erode accountability, and hinder socioeconomic development across the region, and recommends technological integration backed with citizen engagement, among others, to strengthen accountability.
S Philip (Wed,) studied this question.