This article explores how the Brazilian Supreme Court’s strategic timing and calculated judicial inertia have profoundly shaped the regulatory dynamics of platform work in Brazil, consolidating a legal environment favorable to platform corporations. By avoiding timely deliberation on pressing legal disputes regarding platform labor, the Court allowed this economic model to become deeply entrenched, gaining widespread legitimacy among both platform companies and significant segments of the workforce. Consequently, attempts by Lula da Silva’s center-left administration to introduce even minimal labor protections have faced substantial backlash – not only from platform corporations but, paradoxically, also from platform workers who perceive regulation as a threat to their autonomy and economic opportunities. The analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s strategic avoidance facilitated an unlikely coalition between corporate interests and lower socioeconomic strata, complicating regulatory interventions. Ultimately, the article argues that this dynamic exemplifies the intricate relationship between judicial behavior, socioeconomic inequality, and the evolving labor landscape, highlighting the urgent need for more robust and proactive institutional responses to protect labor rights in the digital economy.
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Juliano Zaiden Benvindo
Pablo Holmes
Vincenzo Pietrogiovanni
Global Social Policy
University of Southern Denmark
Universidade de Brasília
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Benvindo et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/69a75cdbc6e9836116a260ff — DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/14680181251413745