A Continuum Approach to Legal Classifications of Persons and Things 

This abstract explores the legal and philosophical implications of rethinking the traditional binary distinction between persons and things, particularly in relation to human remains. The classical framework, rooted in Cartesian dualism, posits a clear separation between the two categories. This distinction, embedded in modern legal systems, aims to protect human dignity and prevent the commodification of human bodies, especially in contexts like slavery and organ trafficking. However, this dichotomy has become increasingly inadequate in addressing the complexities surrounding human remains, as well as other entities that do not fit neatly into either category. The paper argues for a shift from this rigid dualism to a continuum model that recognizes a spectrum of legal statuses between person and thing. Drawing on research conducted during the HOME project, the paper explores how human remains, in particular, occupy an ambiguous position. While the living human body is clearly classified as a person, once deceased, it may be treated as an object or property, as seen in various legal regimes governing burial rights, inheritance, and museum collections. This treatment raises ethical and legal concerns, particularly when the deceased continues to hold cultural, emotional, or religious significance. The aim of the continuum is to move away from the proprietary grammar in which Western law is trapped (Davies & Naffine, 2002), suffering of a lack of vocabulary (Cornu, 2016). Rather than viewing entities as strictly either persons or things, the continuum allows for nuanced legal recognition of intermediate categories (Gidrol-Mistral, 2021). This spectrum would also accommodate other complex entities, such as animals, nature, and artificial intelligence, which challenge the binary classification. The paper discusses how this continuum could be operationalized in legal systems by examining the varying treatment of human remains across different jurisdictions. For example, Anglo-American legal systems, which often deny property rights over corpses but recognize certain possessory or fiduciary duties, provide a basis for understanding how legal categories might shift along the proposed spectrum. The concept of ‘cultural commons’ is also explored as a model for managing human remains in collections, where they are treated not as private property but as shared cultural heritage subject to collective responsibility. The notion of ‘personal thing’ also provides interesting features as a category that reflects entities that are neither fully persons nor fully objects (Perrot, 2022). In conclusion, the continuum model offers a more flexible and ethically sensitive approach to legal classifications. By moving away from the rigid person-thing binary, this proposal provides a conceptual framework that better reflects the complexity of human remains and other entities that do not fit neatly into existing legal categories. This shift might be a first step to a more relational and inclusive legal system that can accommodate the evolving nature of personhood, property, and rights (Swennen, 2022). References Cornu, M. (2016). Les restes humains « patrimonialisés » et la loi. Technè. La science au service de l’histoire de l’art et de la préservation des biens culturels, 44, Article 44. https://doi.org/10.4000/techne.909 Davies, M., & Naffine, N. (2002). Are Persons Property? Legal Debates About Property and Personality (SSRN Scholarly Paper 3814550). https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3814550 Gidrol-Mistral, G. (2021). La (dia)logique du corps. In Mélanges Robert P. Kouri—L’humain au coeur du droit (pp. 41–63). Thomson Reuters. Perrot, X. (2022). L’agentivité juridique des choses-personnes. La summa divisio transgressée? In J.-P. Marguénaud & C. Vial (Eds.), Droits des êtres humains et droits des autres entités: Une nouvelle frontière ? (pp. 175–201). Mare & Martin. Swennen, F. (2022). Persoon, voorwerp, relatie. Tijdschrift Voor Privaatrecht, 4, 1253–1275.