Rilkean memory in the philosophy of Alzheimer’s disease

Not only does Alzheimer's disease impose challenges in the area of health, but also in discussions in the philosophy of medicine. Our analysis of the dilemmas we face in decision- making and autonomy shall illustrate this in view of issues surrounding memory. At first glance, speaking of memory in Alzheimer's, a condition primarily characterized by the deterioration of this capacity, seems somewhat counterintuitive. But this is only due to the use of traditional conceptions of memory. In contrast, the term Rilkean memory coined by Mark Rowlands (2015) presents a possibility for expanding our understanding of memory in the context of those who gradually experience the disappearance of this ability. To this end, this article is divided into an introductory section, which outlines our key claims. Section 2 deals with some standard conceptions of memory, particularly episodic memory and two issues that emerge from its analysis, i.e., autonoesis and mnemicity. Section 3 describes the term Rilkean memory, clarifying its differences with other types of memory and defining this type of memory as both involuntary and autobiographical. Sections 4 and 5 cover two dimensions of Rilkean memory, namely, embodied and affective. Section 6 situates the notion of Rilkean memory in the context of Alzheimer's patients. This section adapts some aspects of Rowlands' original notion and explores Rilkean memory as an entry point into the capacity to remember for those with Alzheimer’s disease. Finally, Section 7 concludes by outlining the central ideas that emerged in this work.