Retributivism, Confrontation, and the Death Penalty: Some Skepticism about Dan Markel's Skepticism

This article critically examines Dan Markel’s skepticism toward retributivist justifications of the death penalty, focusing in particular on his account of moral confrontation between the state and the offender. The author argues that Markel’s objections rely on contested assumptions about responsibility, moral communication, and the expressive function of punishment. By unpacking the concept of confrontation, the article questions whether retributivism necessarily entails the moral deficiencies Markel attributes to capital punishment. The analysis suggests that retributive punishment can, at least in principle, accommodate meaningful moral engagement without collapsing into vengeance or cruelty. Ultimately, the article concludes that Markel’s skepticism, while philosophically provocative, does not decisively undermine retributivist defenses of the death penalty.