LSE Middle East Centre paper series, 09

Too often political discussion of oil-wealthy states like Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) becomes centred on the means in which their economic largesse facilitates political quiescence. While rulers of these states, which I dub ‘super-rentiers’ due to their massive oil and gas wealth, have at times used their riches as a means of buying good will from their citizenries, they cannot and have not completely deterred independent political actors. Of these, ideological agents are, logically, the least likely to be ‘bought off’ and therefore the most viable independent political forces. Nonetheless, political Islam is rarely discussed in the context of the Gulf states which provide few institutionalised opportunities for political participation and do not require welfare services often provided by Islamist groups. In this paper, I discuss the degree to which Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE influence political decision-making and how those governments have chosen to handle the Ikhwan.1 Given my analysis, I provide the following policy recommendations to both regional and Western actors.