Afghanistan’s Constitutional Journey: Hazards of Adopting Foreign Models

Since its independence in 1919, Afghanistan has witnessed a turbulent constitutional history marked by transitions from monarchy to republic, communism to theocracy, and dictatorship to democracy, reflecting a recurring pattern of change and instability. This paper delves into the recurring question of why Afghanistan’s constitutions have failed to bring stability and prosperity to the nation despite numerous attempts. The study pinpoints three main factors for the failure: the lack of Constitutionalism, flaws in the drafting process, and an excessive dependence on foreign models. Firstly, the issue of Constitutionalism is apparent as these constitutions often function symbolically, much like horoscopes, rather than as effective guiding documents for governance. Secondly, there is a failure in the drafting process, characterized by a lack of proper mechanisms and the exclusion of crucial stakeholders, such as women, minorities, NGOs, and academicians. This exclusion has given way to power-hungry individuals and warlords dominating the process, resulting in difficulties in addressing core issues like judicial review, constitutional court, government structure, the role of religion, individual freedoms, and power distribution. The third factor is the overreliance on the Soviet, Western and American models, which fueled the constitutional failures in the country. This research highlights the crucial role of constitutional law in shaping Afghanistan’s future by addressing distribution of power, protecting fundamental freedoms and human rights, encouraging economic activities, maintaining rule of law and establishing stability. The existing study employs a doctrinal research method, utilising primary and secondary data to support its findings.