Meaningfulness in Work

In this chapter, I develop an account of meaningful work that unifies existing findings (philosophical and empirical) about meaningful work by clarifying why the goods of work commonly identified are the goods of work, and why, when this bundle of goods is realized in someone’s work, her work is meaningful in a distinctively valuable way. This unifying account begins with an analysis of what we mean by meaningful work, which draws on ideas from Bernard Williams to suggest that meaningful work is good work that the worker (appropriately) values in a way not conditional on her economic need to work. When someone’s work is meaningful for her, she would do it even if she did not need the money, benefits, insurance, and so forth that it provides. I then sketch a naturalistic, perfectionist conception of meaningful work to complement this analysis. I argue that what makes meaningful work meaningful, and what makes meaningfulness in work valuable, is that such work exercises our natural capacity to cooperate with one another, especially in the mode of expert specialization and division of labor in coalitions built on trust. This account can clarify why bullshit jobs are especially opposed to meaningful work, and be a framework for assessing various future-of-work scenarios.