Priority for Comparative, Not Absolute Benefits

Abstract Prioritarianism is claimed to fare badly in variable-population comparisons. This is so, I argue, because it is understood as absolute prioritarianism, as invoking an increasing, strictly concave function of absolute welfare. That misunderstands Parfit’s priority view by considering the absolute welfare rather than the welfare gains and losses. Therefore, it implies a super-repugnant conclusion and the desirability of welfare diffusion by creating people. However, both implications are implausible – at least if we reject that people can be better off by coming into existence. I present an alternative – comparative prioritarianism – which is concerned only with individual gains and losses. I argue that this avoids the implausible implications, it can be supplemented with further principles that solve the problems of population ethics, and it prevents cyclical orderings if we adopt a set-wise approach to comparing outcomes. Therefore, comparative prioritarianism is better suited to capture the core intuition of the priority view.