The Cornered Mouse: Sanctioned Elites and Authoritarian Realignment in the Japanese Legislature, 1936–1942

This study examines how economic elites respond to the erosion of democratic checks and balances, focusing on the Japanese legislature from 1936 to 1942. Using an original dataset of Diet members’ biographies and board memberships, it analyzes the Imperial Japanese Army’s consolidation of power and shifts in parliamentary voting patterns amid the suppression of dissent. Employing difference-in-differences and event-study designs, this study evaluates the effects of two key shocks: economic sanctions and wartime procurement. Legislators tied to sanction-hit sectors—such as textiles and petrochemicals, the weakest performers in the stock market—shifted toward authoritarian alignment. Biographical and legislative records suggest this shift was facilitated by regime-backed campaign finance. In contrast, legislators from procurement-dependent sectors, such as automobiles, maintained stable voting behavior. The findings complicate the conventional view that sanctions prompt elites to advocate international policy change. Instead, they show that sanctions can drive vulnerable actors to submit domestically, thereby accelerating authoritarian consolidation.