Antivegetarianism and the Fragile Status of Animals in Schopenhauer's Ethics

Abstract Prima facie, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) appears like a modern advocate of animal rights, especially in contrast to Kant's anthropocentric deontologism, which only recognizes indirect duties toward animals. The rationale for animal rights is rooted in Schopenhauer's notion of extended compassion, which in turn is grounded in his voluntaristic metaphysics and gradualist approach to the human-animal distinction. I argue, however, that Schopenhauer's position is deeply ambivalent and fraught with problematic assumptions about animals, which he conceives as imprisoned in an eternal present and less capable of suffering than humans. Schopenhauer even seems committed to the view that we should eat animals, since (“northern”) humans would be harmed more by not eating meat than animals who are killed unexpectedly and painlessly. At best, Schopenhauer advocates compassionate carnivorism, but neither vegetarianism nor veganism.