Duties to protect oneself from loneliness

While the phenomenon of chronic loneliness has garnered increasing philosophical attention in recent years, the question of whether it is morally incumbent on individuals to protect themselves against it has been neglected by ethicists. This article addresses that gap by arguing that many of us do, in fact, bear such duties. Importantly, this argument does not rely on the contested notion of self-regarding duties. Although duties to protect oneself from chronic loneliness may be derived from such obligations, my contention will be that they can be wholly grounded in other-regarding moral considerations. As will become clear, chronic loneliness not only often harms our personal relationships and put strain on caregivers and public health systems (among other possible societal costs), but most of us also have access to at least some low-cost, evidence-based strategies for preventing and alleviating loneliness. The article concludes by examining how certain common omissions—such as failing to cultivate a broad and diverse social network before old age and lacking sufficient in-person interaction during adolescence and early adulthood—may impede the fulfilment of the proposed duties.