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March 10, 2026Global Policy0 citations

The Unintended Consequences of German Deterrence

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UKUlrich Kühn

Key Points

  • This research aims to explore the implications of Germany's changing deterrence strategy within NATO.
  • Analysis of Germany's participation in NATO nuclear sharing.
  • Evaluation of planned conventional weapons acquisitions.
  • Examination of official statements on deterrence strategy.
  • Assessment of potential unintended consequences for regional stability.
  • Increased focus on modern conventional weapons amidst nuclear deterrence.
  • Unclear theoretical basis for the evolving deterrence posture.
  • Potential for adverse effects in policy discussions due to overlooked consequences.
  • Need for new arms control measures to supplement military rearmament efforts.

Abstract

ABSTRACT Germany's evolving deterrence posture boils down to continued participation in NATO nuclear sharing and an ambitious conventional rearmament program. Due to its non‐nuclear status and a result of decades of underinvestment, Germany prioritizes modern conventional weapons. A significant portion of Berlin's acquisition plans is earmarked for deterrence commitments along the Eastern Flank and for so‐called “deep precision strike” capabilities. The theory behind these plans appears less clear. A closer examination of capabilities and official statements suggests that Germany's evolving deterrence posture could produce unintended consequences that have not yet been fully acknowledged in policy circles. To strengthen deterrence, stability, and non‐proliferation, ideally, a novel arms control approach for Europe would complement German rearmament. Prospects for such an approach are nevertheless dim.

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Cite This Study

Ulrich Kühn (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69af952b70916d39fea4c701https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70134
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