Full moral status and trans-sufferers

Abstract This paper examines whether trans-sufferers—hypothetical transhuman beings incapable of suffering—can attain full moral status within a welfarist moral framework, which typically anchors moral status in the capacity to suffer. The paper explores the implications of biomedical advancements aimed at reducing or eliminating suffering. While traditional accounts equate sentience with moral status, privileging the ability to suffer, this emphasis marginalizes beings whose capacity for suffering is diminished or absent. The paper critiques this bias, arguing that it leads to perverse outcomes: as beings suffer less, their claim to moral status weakens. To resolve this contradiction, the paper proposes reframing welfarism by supplemental the capacity for pleasure as the foundational criterion for moral status. Through this lens, trans-sufferers—despite their inability to suffer—possess interests, pursue well-being, and are thus morally considerable. The paper extends this logic to full moral status, showing that key principles such as non-interference (McMahan 2002), the capacity to care (Jaworska 2007), and fairness (Broome 1991) can be coherently applied within a pleasure-based framework. Finally, the paper defends this revised account against two objections: that biomedical enhancement is not inevitable, and that the framework is redundant. It concludes that the pleasure-based account accommodates both suffering and non-suffering sentient beings, offering a more inclusive ethical framework for future moral agents.