Abstract What role do non-elected bureaucrats play when elections provide imperfect accountability and create incentives for pandering? We develop a model where politicians and bureaucrats interact to implement policy. Both can either be good, sharing the voters’ preferences over policies, or bad, intent on enacting policies that favor special interests. Our analysis identifies the conditions under which good bureaucrats choose to support, oppose, or force pandering. When bureaucrats wield significant influence over policy decisions, good politicians lose their incentives to pander, a shift that ultimately benefits voters. An intermediate level of bureaucratic influence over policymaking can be voter-optimal: large enough to prevent pandering but small enough to avoid granting excessive influence to potentially bad bureaucrats .
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Simón Lodato
Christos Mavridis
Federico Vaccari
The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
University of Chieti-Pescara
Middlesex University
University of Bergamo
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Lodato et al. (Sat,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/69b606ea83145bc643d1d623 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewag003
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