Dense-Compact Security Model: A Novel Paradigm for Information-Nullifying Cryptographic Systems

We introduce the Dense-Compact Security Model (DCSM) as a novel paradigm for defining security in cryptographic systems. Unlike traditional models that rely on computational hardness assumptions or key-based protections, DCSM characterizes security in terms of information exposure nullification. We define Dense Security as the property where any observable output reveals statistically nullified information about the underlying plaintext, and Compact Security as the ability to reduce potentially infinite adversarial attempts into a finite set of invariants. The combination establishes Dense-Compact Security where any leakage is either statistically meaningless or structurally reducible to non-informative invariants. This framework provides quantifiable information-theoretic bounds on adversarial knowledge gain and demonstrates broad applicability across homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation, and privacy-preserving data systems.