This article argues that one organized subjectivity supports two non-identical modes of self-relation: minimal selfhood, operative in ongoing experience and action, and narrative selfhood, organized in reflection. Minimal selfhood is the pre-reflective first-personal character of experience: in action, the subject is not given as an object but is implicitly present as the one perceiving, moving, and coping. Narrative selfhood becomes salient when experience is taken up explicitly for autobiographical interpretation, self-ascription, and metacognitive report. The central claim is that one organized subjectivity supports two modes of self-relation whose temporal relation requires explanation. The argument draws on converging evidence from phenomenology, motor control and agency research, work on the default mode network and bodily self-consciousness, source and reality monitoring, and clinical research on depersonalization and derealization. The transition from action to reflection is therefore treated here as an explanatory problem internal to the distinction itself.
Ilya Tarasov (Mon,) studied this question.