Signal transmission and information governance: supply chain shared auditor and corporate artificial intelligence adoption

Purpose While the supply chain shared auditor is emerging as a novel governance mechanism for enhancing transparency, its role in facilitating the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) remains underexplored. This study investigates how the presence of a supply chain shared auditor promotes corporate AI adoption. Design/methodology/approach Utilizing panel data from Chinese listed supply chain companies, this study employs a Tobit model with year and industry fixed effects to analyze the relationship between the supply chain shared auditor and the level of corporate AI adoption. The moderating effect of the CEO’s IT background is further tested through interaction terms. Findings The existence of a supply chain shared auditor significantly promotes corporate AI adoption. This positive effect is strengthened when the firm’s CEO has an IT background. Mechanism testing indicates that, on the one hand, supply chain shared auditors exert a “governance effect”, mitigating managerial myopia and thereby promoting corporate artificial intelligence adoption. On the other hand, supply chain shared auditors exert an “information effect”, reducing levels of information asymmetry and thereby promoting corporate artificial intelligence adoption. Originality/value This paper applies signaling theory to the study of artificial intelligence adoption within enterprises by supply chain shared auditors, thereby expanding the application scenarios of signaling theory. Furthermore, this research bridges the fields of auditing studies and corporate governance research, thereby specifying how and when this governance mechanism most effectively translates into technological advancement.