Digital asset markets have grown to exceed four trillion dollars in total value, with more than 562 million holders worldwide, yet most governments remain structurally unprepared to govern them. This paper advances two arguments. First, market supervision infrastructure is a structural necessity, not a policy option, supported by three converging rationales: market integrity cannot self-organise without a monitoring substrate; state governance of digital finance requires transaction visibility; and international financial integration increasingly compels it. Second, the architecture of that infrastructure is not predetermined. We develop two analytical tools: (i) a typology of four observable supervision models, distinguished by the locus of capability and institutional anchor: the Delegated Financial Model (Model A: Singapore, Japan, UK), the Centralised Financial Model (Model B: EU, Hong Kong), the Enforcement-First Model (Model C: United States), and the State-Integrated Supervision Architecture or SISA (Model D: Vietnam); and (ii) a model selection framework of five hierarchically ordered variables mapping institutional conditions to viable models. Vietnam serves as the primary empirical case. Between June and December 2025, five policy instruments assembled each layer of a SISA stack, identity infrastructure first, licensing and reporting second, state-owned analytics third, making Vietnam the most advanced emerging economy example of a state building supervision as the enabling precondition for controlled market expansion.
Tran et al. (Mon,) studied this question.