The influence of historical disputes on the formation and functioning of coalitions and alliances in East Asia involving South Korea and Japan

The article analyzes the influence of historical disputes between South Korea and Japan on the formation and functioning of multilateral coalition interaction formats in Northeast Asia. The subject of the study is the institutional mechanisms of coordination that emerge in the context of limited bilateral cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo. Special attention is given to the transformation of multilateral interaction in the fields of security and economic-institutional formats, including the formats of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The research aims to identify how historical contradictions between South Korea and Japan affect the nature and depth of their cooperation within regional organizations and associations, as well as the choice of institutional interaction forms and the redistribution of roles among key participants in the regional coalition architecture. The methodological basis consists of historical-political and institutional approaches, comparative analysis, and a problem-chronological method that allow tracing the evolution of coalition mechanisms and their functional specifics. The scientific novelty of the work lies in interpreting historical disputes not only as a factor limiting bilateral interaction between South Korea and Japan but also as a structuring element defining the institutional logic of multilateral formats involving these countries. The study establishes that in the field of security, the influence of historical contradictions between South Korea and Japan manifests in a predominance of mediated forms of coordination, while in the economic dimension, it is reflected in an expansion of interaction in formats that ensure the depoliticization of sensitive issues. The findings indicate that multilateral mechanisms perform a dual function, providing resilience of cooperation in strategically significant sectors while simultaneously limiting the potential for resolving historical contradictions. It concludes that a compromise model of interaction between Japan and South Korea is forming, which combines multilateral coordination in security and economics, limited institutionalization of bilateral cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo, and selective depoliticization of historically sensitive issues, determining the prospects for further development of cooperation in Northeast Asia.