Research on the Core Pricing Mechanism of Shared Energy Storage for Wind Power Systems with Incentive Compatibility

The rapid growth of renewable energy and the inherent volatility of wind power grid integration have imposed stringent requirements on power system security and economic operation. To address this challenge, energy storage systems (ESSs) are widely adopted as flexible regulation tools; however, their high capital costs make the shared energy storage model a more efficient and viable solution. This paper proposes an optimal configuration model for wind farms participating in shared energy storage (SES) based on cooperative game theory. First, integrating wind power output forecasting data and market electricity price information, a wind-storage combined optimization model accounting for wind power uncertainty is first established. Subsequently, a core pricing strategy integrating the core allocation rule with the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is proposed to realize the fair allocation of energy storage resources and effective revenue incentives. Finally, comparative experiments between the proposed core pricing mechanism and the fixed pricing mechanism verify its superiority in terms of social welfare, budget balance, and allocation fairness. The results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism not only enhances the overall social benefits of the wind-storage system but also effectively ensures the incentive compatibility of all participants and the stability of the alliance, providing feasible theoretical and methodological support for the economic dispatch of wind-farm-shared energy storage.