Signaling status through public goods: China, the United States, and the global leadership deficit

Abstract Will China replace the United States as the next global leader? Rather than a transfer of leadership from Washington to Beijing, this article argues that the international system is increasingly characterized by a global leadership deficit—a condition in which major powers possess substantial capabilities and provide visible international public goods, yet fail to generate the durable recognition and authority required for system-wide leadership. The concept of global leadership deficit captures a structural condition that arises not from an absence of power, but from the interaction of selective public-goods provision and contested recognition. Public-goods provision is theorized as a mechanism of status signaling through which states translate material capabilities into leadership claims that depend on audience recognition. Because interpretation and expectations of durability mediate such signaling, conspicuous provision can increase visibility without necessarily producing sustained followership. A comparative analysis of China and the United States shows how different strategies of bounded leadership converge on this outcome. China emphasizes agenda-setting while limiting long-term costly obligations, while the United States concentrates resources in system-anchoring domains and retrenches from redistributive roles. The result is not hegemonic replacement or stable co-leadership, but a fragmented international order marked by a persistent leadership deficit.