A sociological conceptualisation of morality

This article presents a comprehensive sociological conceptualisation of morality which can be used in empirical research, as a basis for further theorisation, and for dialogue with existing studies in sociology and other disciplines. It clarifies, systematises and extends Durkheim's incomplete works on morality, long misinterpreted and overlooked. Morality is conceptualised a system of interrelated concepts, including moral ideal, moral obligation, social attachment to the group, and individual autonomy. Grounded in Durkheim's notion of the social as a symbolic reality irreducible to the individual, ‘objective’, ‘social’ morality is shaped by ‘sacred’ moral ideals which exist in the symbolic domain of collective representations. Social morality is different from mores which are daily practices pertaining to the profane domain where moral rules are applied with ‘compromise’, and different from individual moralities. Extending Durkheim, moral obligation is elaborated through the subject, matter, addressee, and mechanisms of obligation, consistent with and indicative of the other elements of morality. The concepts of (a) morality produced by the collectivity/society/group (the morality of society) and (b) morality produced by social institutions like the state and media (the moral order) open pathways for analysing the roles of each and their juxtaposition, enabling new interpretations, empirically grounded critiques, and normativity. Together with the concepts of mores and individual moralities, these two types of moralities establish a multidimensional space open to empirical research.