The article discusses the issues of inter-agency interaction between tax and customs authorities. Based on the analysis of the Agreement on Information Interaction between the Federal Customs Service and the Federal Tax Service, as well as scientific literature, levels and main directions of such interaction are identified, and current aspects of cooperation between tax and customs authorities in exercising control and oversight powers are defined. Special attention is paid to the fact that the interaction in question has long historical traditions, and an important characteristic of it is its financial focus. The author highlights a triad of state control ensured by the inter-agency interaction of tax and customs authorities, which includes customs, tax, and currency control. All these types of state control can be included in the structure of public financial control. As a factor confirming the proximity of the oversight functions of the authorities in question, the subordination to the Ministry of Finance of Russia is highlighted. Systemic analysis and synthesis, classification and legal formalization, and the problem method were used in the research. The main conclusions of the conducted study are as follows: 1. It is concluded that contemporary interaction between tax and customs authorities is seen as exclusively informational. 2. In the information exchange and coordination of activities between customs and tax authorities, levels (federal and territorial) and directions (control, regulatory, supportive, informational, and technological) can be distinguished. 3. The control and supervisory competence of tax and customs authorities determines the forms and mechanisms of inter-agency interaction. The basis for all directions of information exchange between departments at all levels is the implementation of tax, customs, and currency control. 4. An important theoretical conclusion is made that the development of issues of interaction between tax and customs authorities is designed to advance the study of various common institutions and mechanisms for these federal executive authorities (for example, the monitoring institution).
Saniyat Agamagomedova (2026) studied this question.