The illegality of follow-up agreements arising from reciprocal tariffs: an international trade law analysis

Abstract In the wake of the USA’s imposition of reciprocal tariffs earlier this year, some countries and regions have concluded bilateral trade agreement frameworks with the USA. The legal character and substantive content of these frameworks raise serious concerns regarding their compatibility with existing multilateral trade rules. Preliminary analysis suggests that many of these agreements contain provisions potentially in breach of foundational principles of the World Trade Organization, particularly the Most-Favoured-Nation obligation and the general prohibition on quantitative restrictions. Such developments risk compelling states into de facto violations of international trade law, thereby weakening the integrity of the multilateral trading system. Responding effectively to the challenges posed by reciprocal tariffs is thus critical to preserving the foundational norms of multilateralism. Of particular concern is the strategic use of bilateralism by the USA to construct a dense web of agreements that may, over time, erode the multilateral order by stealth.