Limits on Terms, Limits on Control: The Effect of Chief Executive Term Limits on Bureaucratic Responsiveness

ABSTRACT Term limits for elected officials are often advocated to enhance responsiveness to constituents. We argue however, that they can weaken executive power by reducing bureaucratic deference. Using an experimental survey of state bureaucrats across nine U.S. states, we investigate the impact of gubernatorial term limits on bureaucratic effort and prioritization of executive preferences. Our findings reveal that bureaucrats exert less effort and place lower importance on the preferences of term‐limited governors compared to those at the beginning of their term or running for re‐election. However, these effects are modest in size, suggesting that while gubernatorial term limits create space for bureaucrats to afford executives less deference, the degree to which they ultimately shirk is limited. Our findings highlight the unique ways in which term limits affect elected executives and that term limits affect not only how the officials subject to them represent the public, but also how others in government interact with them.