Competition Authorities (CAs) form a specific type of non-majoritarian institution tasked with safeguarding competitive markets and fundamental economic freedoms by controlling excessive concentrations of economic power, which can undermine democratic processes. CAs play a vital role in aligning markets with democratic principles, and the enforcement of competition law is often cited as a safeguard of liberal democracy. However, being established as independent regulatory bodies insulated from electoral politics, capture, and short-termism, their mandate is limited to assessing economic effects and safeguarding competition. This paper examines how CAs, as independent decision-makers, can safeguard democratic institutions and the values of liberal democracy in a complex and contested economic and societal environment. It asks how CAs can counterbalance, constrain, and complement majoritarian decision-making in times of overlapping economic, geopolitical, and democratic crises, as they are increasingly expected to assume responsibilities beyond the narrow protection of competition. As their mandate remains primarily economic, competition authorities cannot openly weigh political values without risking politicization, technocratic overreach, and erosion of democratic legitimacy. Preserving independent expertise must therefore be paired with stronger accountability and responsiveness to democratic demands. This paper proposes a constructive way through responsive enforcement, drawing on theories of responsive regulation, particularly tripartism, and social accountability, to strengthen institutional responsiveness, accountability, and democratic legitimacy. This paper is a contribution to a Special Issue that critically analyses the role of non-majoritarian instruments and institutions with respect to three challenges that shape contemporary democracies in Europe: socio-economic inequality and discrimination, growing authoritarianism, and the pressing climate crisis.
Kati Cseres (Mon,) studied this question.