This paper develops a dynamic game-theoretic model to evaluate market competitiveness in industries characterized by price competition and adjustment stickiness. We extend the dynamic oligopoly framework for estimating market competitiveness in the literature from a quantity-setting to a price-setting context with differentiated goods. By deriving the subgame perfect equilibrium in a linear-quadratic structure, we utilize an index analogous to the price conjectural variation to measure market competitiveness with differentiated goods. The model is applied to the Chinese retail oil market, and we find that the Chinese retail oil market, particularly dominated by two state firms, exhibits characteristics close to a collusive benchmark within the maintained model. The dynamic game model provides a tractable analytical tool for antitrust authorities to monitor strategic coordination in dynamic environments where price transparency or regulation may facilitate tacit coordination of pricing behavior to a high degree.
Zheng et al. (2026) studied this question.