Phenomenological Cognitivism: Integrating Phenomenological Analyses with Neurocognitive Mechanisms

This paper proposes a pluralistic model of explanation that expands the epistemological foundations of cognitive science by integrating phenomenological analysis into the framework of neurocognitive mechanisms. We endorse the neurocognitive approach, which accounts for cognitive capacities as higher-level aspects exhibited by a multilevel computing mechanism- namely the brain. Building on this foundation, we argue that phenomenological functional analysis – understood as constitutive analyses of cognitive dynamics- adds a complementary level that can clarify the internal structure of cognitive capacities. Phenomenology, in this sense, provides epistemic constraints that help scaffold empirical research by revealing how capacities are enacted across different experiential layers. We introduce phenomenological cognitivism as a framework for functionally decomposing experience into constitutive operations and representational structures, offering descriptions that remain compatible with computational and biological modeling. Rather than appealing to qualitative or first-person content, this approach formulates structured analyses of experience that support formal integration. In the final section, we illustrate this proposal with a pluralistic model of inhibition, distinguishing motor from mental inhibition. We show how phenomenological functional analysis reveals representational and functional distinctions overlooked at behavioral or computational levels. This pluralistic framework thus broadens the scope of cognitive modeling by embedding neurocognitive mechanisms within conceptual richness of phenomenological analyses.