Abstract In the literature, one finds no shortage of discussion on reasons to deny the truth of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), and with them, reasons to reject the rationalist systems associated with it. In this paper, I develop the thought that there is a hitherto unexplored dimension along which the PSR can be evaluated that has substantive consequences for how we understand both the principle and the rationalisms derived from it. A principle, I argue, can be endorsed, used, or have its truth validated by a system of thought; and these roles can be played independently of one another. Bearing this three-fold distinction in mind, we can come to see that there are actually a much larger variety of ways in which one can be a rationalist (or fail to be a rationalist), and in which one can be in the business of (or not be in the business of) the PSR. To draw out the value of recognizing these different roles, I explore the system of Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna, who, it has recently been suggested, appears to endorse the PSR.
Ricki Bliss (Sat,) studied this question.