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April 15, 2026Behavioral Research in Accounting0 citations

The Effect of Enacting Third-Party Verification on Taxpayer Behavior: A Cryptocurrency Setting

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CAChelsea Rae AustinWBWilliam D. Brink

Key Points

  • This research investigates how third-party verification affects taxpayer behavior and compliance decisions.
  • Conducted a series of experiments to test taxpayer responses to verification rules.
  • Analyzed decision-making processes related to tax compliance.
  • Measured changes in tax evasion behaviors pre- and post-verification implementation.
  • Introduction of third-party verification rules increased the use of methods avoiding verification.
  • Among those avoiding verification, instances of tax evasion significantly increased.
  • Overall, tax evasion did not decrease with new verification rules, contradicting regulators' expectations.

Abstract

ABSTRACT Third-party verification rules are intended to increase compliance and can split taxpayers’ evasion decision into two stages. First, taxpayers must decide to commit to full tax compliance or search for ways to avoid third-party verification. Second, taxpayers make their tax compliance decisions when filing their tax returns. We expect new rules for third-party verification will increase the use of methods that avoid third-party verification, as taxpayers want to keep their compliance options open. The choice to avoid third-party verification itself may not be unethical, but it has ethical undertones and can start taxpayers down a slippery slope of unethical decision-making. We conduct a series of experiments showing the introduction of third-party verification rules significantly increases the use of methods that avoid verification. Among those using these methods, tax evasion significantly increases. We find no evidence that overall tax evasion decreases when new third-party verification is implemented, despite regulators’ intentions. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.

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Cite This Study

Austin et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69df2bcae4eeef8a2a6b0c63https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-2025-022
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Also Consider

Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context:

  1. 1Experimental Investigation of Ethical Standards and Perceived Probability of Audit on Intentional Noncompliance.1996
  2. 2A Perspective on the Experimental Analysis of Taxpayer Reporting.1991 · 3 citations
  3. 3Determinants of Taxpayers’ Attitudes Towards Tax Avoidance: An Empirical Study2025
  4. 4SUMMARIES OF PAPERS IN THIS ISSUE2024
  5. 5Omnichannel Taxation, Perceived Tax Audit Probability and Digital Tax Compliance: A Game Theoretic Analysis2025