Abstract Goldstein and Kirk–Giannini have recently argued that artificial language agents can possess well-being in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. Here, I challenge their position, contending that their arguments fail to establish that consciousness is dispensable for well-being. Moreover, their arguments generate counterintuitive implications that are more problematic than those they attribute to views requiring consciousness for welfare subjecthood. Thus, consciousness (or rather sentience) should still be treated as a requirement for AI welfare.
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Walter Veit
Asian Journal of Philosophy
University of Reading
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Walter Veit (Thu,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/698827c90fc35cd7a8846cb8 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-026-00382-3
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