Infanticide in bioethics: Singer’s argument and cross-framework debates

Abstract The aim of this article is to analyze Peter Singer’s utilitarian approach to infanticide and compare it with alternative moral frameworks through systematic philosophical analysis. Singer argues that cognitive capacities, such as self-awareness and the ability to form preferences, rather than species membership, should determine moral consideration. This perspective leads him to conclude that newborns do not possess full moral personhood and may be subject to different ethical calculations. This includes his controversial “replaceability argument” regarding severely disabled infants. The analysis also considers supporting views from philosophers like Michael Tooley and Jeff McMahan, as well as opposition from deontological and natural law theorists, who maintain that human dignity is inherent and not dependent on specific capacities. The debate has practical implications, as evidenced by the Groningen Protocol in the Netherlands, and extends to broader societal concerns such as eugenics, disability rights, and healthcare resource allocation. Recent advances in neonatal care and prenatal testing have complicated these discussions by improving outcomes and altering decision-making contexts. While Singer’s framework appears philosophically coherent, it remains morally troubling. Conversely, alternative approaches have yet to resolve the fundamental disagreements surrounding human moral worth.