This essay analyzes three “intentions” that operate in theories of textual interpretation: intentio auctoris (author’s intention), intentio lectoris (reader’s intention), and intentio operis (intention of the work). These categories are then transferred to the analysis of legal interpretation. In particular, it discusses the notion of “intention of the (constituent) legislator.” The central thesis is that, although formalist and radical skeptical positions still persist in the debate, a more fruitful path lies in a moderately realistic theory oriented toward intentio operis. On this approach, the text (of the constitution) imposes interpretive restrictions through a community of interpreters, thus allowing for the possibility of interpretive error – under public criteria of correction – without falling into a subjectivist conception.
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Mauricio Maldonado-Muñoz
Revus
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Mauricio Maldonado-Muñoz (Wed,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/69b3aaa802a1e69014ccb727 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/15u89