This article argues that several central problems in MARP can be clarified only through a foundational distinction between real finitude and attributive finitude. Real finitude is not a cognitive limitation, nor a byproduct of judgment, but the comprehensive condition of actual determination as such. Attributive finitude, by contrast, is the local limit through which measurement, stabilization, and attribution become possible within a specific referential framework. Without this distinction, the question of attribution is easily misconstrued as a transformational passage from the absolute to the limited, complete induction is misunderstood as exhaustive possession of the object, and recurrent behavioral or affective phenomena are reduced to their merely psychological aspect. The article first shows that attribution does not generate real finitude but operates within it as a local organization of identities, relations, and measurable differences. It then argues that complete induction in MARP is grounded not in exhaustive objectivity but in the continued success of the framework that stabilizes subject, predicate, and relation across time. Finally, the article extends this structure to behavioral and affective repetition, suggesting that certain forms of addiction, habit, attachment, and love can be understood as attempts to reactivate a previously successful structure of passage while confusing local success with global viability.
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Laurent Theophile D'Artagnan
University of Philosophical Research
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Laurent Theophile D'Artagnan (Thu,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/69d0afde659487ece0fa5fef — DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19386954