When Reformers Become Spoilers: Discretionary Implementation of Extraordinary Restitution Reform under Extractivism in Colombia

In response to growing policy challenges, such as postconflict transitions and climate change, exceeding the scope of existing institutions, governments often enact extraordinary reforms—that is, nonincremental institutional innovations regulating state action through fast-tracking procedures, expanded mandates, and normative recalibration in previously unregulated domains. How do governments resolve policy conflicts when extraordinary reform collides with entrenched rules and interests embedded in previous institutional frameworks? We develop a theory of discretionary implementation, showing how governments use layering and conversion to diminish extraordinary reform. We examine Colombia’s ethnic land restitution program (2012–18), which clashed with extractivism, by employing process tracing of novel datasets on administrative cases and judicial rulings, and 14 in-depth interviews. We find that the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos delayed case processing via layering and restricted judicial discretion through conversion, effectively undermining restitution. Our findings extend theories of institutional change by revealing how governments mediate, and sometimes undermine, extraordinary reforms.