Optimality Versus Politics: The Tragedy of the Commons and Mitigating Institutions in COVID-19 Policies

Abstract This article examines the co-production of Non-Medical Interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic as the Tragedy of the Commons among political incumbents in multi-level governance systems. We argue that when policy leadership has political costs, a second-order prisoner’s dilemma arises, leading incumbents to strategically withdraw from their jurisdictional responsibilities and shift policy burdens to other levels of government, resulting in the underproduction of policy measures. Drawing on a global dataset, we assess how political institutions and incentives shaped these inefficiencies in different phases of the pandemic. Our findings contribute to the broader understanding of strategic interactions in multi-level governance by demonstrating how jurisdictional authority is not simply assigned but is actively claimed and ceded in response to institutional incentives and structural constraints. In doing so, this research highlights both the governance vulnerabilities of multi-level systems in crisis response and their structural advantages that can prevent extreme policy failures.